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Labour market access for asylum seekers and refugees under the Common European 
Asylum System 
 
by Franziska Weber1 
Abstract 
 
The paper identifies a policy inconsistency between the EU’s asylum and the EU’s labour 
migration policies and makes a call for stronger convergence. The analysis starts off by 
setting out the EU’s current and future economic challenges with a view to its ageing 
population and low fertility rates, which displays the EU’s need for migrants. Two trends can 
be observed: The lacking success of Europe’s highly-skilled regime, ie the Blue Card scheme, 
casts doubts on the suitability of the EU’s labour migration policy and its ability to meet the 
EU’s labour market’s needs this way. Labour market access for people that come to the EU to 
seek asylum on the other hand is subject to quite a number of restrictions. The lack of 
coordination seems short-sighted. In an attempt to advocate for stronger coherence the 
paper sets out the rights to access the EU labour market of those who come to the EU as 
asylum seekers in detail and explores reform potential where these rights can be expanded 
consistent with the EU’s labour market needs. It looks at EU law in general and refers to 
Germany as an implementation example. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the light of ongoing demographic changes, the EU needs migrants to uphold its welfare 
systems. Whereas the EU’s need for migrants is officially recognized when it comes to policy 
decisions concerning economic migration,2 it is rather unheard of when discussing asylum 
policy at EU level. EU asylum policy and labour/economic migration policy are two 
historically separate fields. There seems to be, however, a significant overlap with a view to 
the target group of both policies.3 Putting it bluntly, a policy inconsistency can currently be 
observed in the sense that the EU on the one hand actively (and rather unsuccessfully) seeks 
to encourage certain labour migration from outside the EU and on the other hand actively 
(and rather unsuccessfully) seeks to restrict the arrival of asylum seekers. Their rights to 
access the EU’s labour market are, furthermore, subject to quite a number of restrictions. 
This paper discusses the current degree of labour market permeability of the Common 
European Asylum system (CEAS) – by illustrating the European minimum rules and using 
Germany as an implementation example. This sheds light on the legal conditions under 
which people that come to the EU as asylum seekers may enter the labour market and 
allows a critical assessment. It comes to the conclusion that the observed incoherence in the 
two approaches seems short-sighted with a view to the EU’s current and upcoming 
economic challenges and advocates rethinking. 
 
Asylum policy is high on the agenda in the EU these days. A significant increase in asylum 
applications and dramatic sea arrivals by the Mediterranean Sea call for changes in the 
current approach. Many arguments for why changes in the CEAS – that was actually only 
recently revised4 – are required, are put forward by human rights, European and 
                                                          
2 See, for instance, Recitals 3-5, 7 of Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (The Blue Card 
Directive). 
3 The relationship is, for instance, being seriously discussed in Germany. 
4 The current four core legislative documents are: Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons 
as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (The revised Qualifications Directive); 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person; 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection (The revised Asylum Procedures directive); Directive 
2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the 
international lawyers.5 By reflecting upon the European rules on labour market access for 
anyone undergoing the EU’s asylum procedure, this paper adds a number of important 
internal market arguments – arguably the core of European integration – to the discussion. 
 
 
2. Economic challenges faced by the EU’s internal market 
 
The European population is ageing: life expectancy is increasing; longevity is on the rise and 
fertility rates are low.6 The development of the fertility rates of the European MS over the 
past years can be retrieved from Eurostat: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
reception of applicants for international protection (The revised Reception Conditions Directive). The 
implementation deadline for the revised Asylum Procedures and Reception Conditions Directives was in July 
2015. It turns out that most of the European MS have not implemented these directives yet: Regarding the 
Revised Receptions Conditions Directive: on 17th August only Latvia, Cyprus and Portugal have implemented 
the changes; regarding the revised Asylum Procedures Directive, only Portugal has implemented the new 
legislation according. This information was retrieved from eur-lex. It seems to be not entirely updated, given 
that, for instance, Germany should be mentioned among those countries that did implement the new 
legislation. See for the historical development of the CEAS, M. Provera (2013), The Detention of Asylum Seekers 
in the European Union and Australia – a Comparative Analysis (Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP), Oisterwijk), pp. 44. 
5 See eg H. O’Nions (2014), Asylum - a right denied: a critical analysis of European asylum policy, Farnham 
[u.a.]: Ashgate. 
6 Source: Regions 2020, Demographic challenges for European Regions, Commission of the European 
Communities, Brussels November 2008. 
 
One can see that with very few exceptions there has been a constant decrease of fertility 
rates across the different European Member States (MS). A recent report summarizes the 
situation as follows:  
“The age structure of the EU population is projected to dramatically change in the coming 
decades due to the dynamics of fertility, life expectancy and migration rates. The overall size 
of the population is projected to not only be larger by 2060, but also much older than it is 
now.”7 
Therefore, crucial changes are expected to the way in which the European population will be 
structured, the age-wise distribution:8 
                                                          
7 European Commission (2014), The 2015 Aging report - Underlying Assumptions and Projection 
Methodologies, European Economy 8/2014, p. 1. 
8 See Eurostat. 
 
 
This chart reflects the expected situation in the EU in the year 2080. It is characterized by a 
strong increase in the number of elderly people and relatively fewer working-age people. 
Overall, it is expected that there will be more people living in the EU, but the age profile will 
significantly change. The work-age population in the EU has started declining in 2014.9 Of 
course, in assessing these scenarios a number of assumptions are being made, including 
about net migration. However, even if the exact magnitude of the development varies with 
different statistics, there is a consensus on the general trend and the need to attract 
migrants to absorb (part of) its effect.10 The scenario poses a threat to EU welfare and the 
effective working of the internal market. For instance, there is not/will not be a large enough 
working population to sustain health care and social welfare systems (including eg pension 
                                                          
9 European Commission (2015), Inception Impact Assessment, Review of Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment (“EU Blue Card” Directive), p. 2. 
10 European Commission (2014), The 2015 Aging report - Underlying Assumptions and Projection 
Methodologies, European Economy 8/2014, p. 2 reads that “as a result of these different trends among age-
groups, the demographic oldage dependency ratio (people aged 65 or above relative to those aged 15-64) is 
projected to increase from 27.8% to 50.1% in the EU as a whole over the projection period. This implies that 
the EU would move from having about four working-age people for every person aged over 65 years to two 
workingage people.” For a similar view, see http://prevenblog.com/en/demographic-change-an-emerging-risk-
factor-in-europe/; for Germany, see eg H. Brücker (2015), Aktueller Bericht – Mehr Chancen als Risiken durch 
Zuwanderung, 1/2015 (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung), p.2. 
funds) for the rest of the society.11 Furthermore, one can also question what will happen to 
the EU’s productivity if the number of available workers is considerably reduced.12 The latter 
point ties in with an aspect that is already a concern for many European countries these 
days: shortage of skills. For many years already Germany, for instance, has been in need of 
additional workers for a number of professions, such as engineers, IT experts or doctors.13 
Furthermore, the shortage is not only applicable in sectors that would typically be qualified 
as “highly-qualified” but also, for instance, in the care sector (for elderly, in hospitals etc.).14 
The Commission in 2015 identified the key shortages for the EU in the science, technology, 
engineering and healthcare sectors.15 
 
Having said this for the EU in general it is true that these threats are more pronounced in 
some European MS than in others. In the aftermath of the financial crisis that particularly hit 
some of the Southern European countries, a substantial amount of migration has been 
happening from the South to the North of the EU.16 We have also seen an increase in 
migration from Europe to South-America17, for instance. Also, countries that complain about 
a shortage of skilled workers do have a significant unemployment rate. This begs the 
question of what happens if such shortages cannot be tackled internally – either by national 
policies or inner-European migration. This would mean that vocational training could be 
offered to educate nationals who currently lack certain qualifications. At the same time 
increased intra-European migration could fill some of the emerging gaps. 
                                                          
11 See also European Commission (2014), The 2015 Aging report - Underlying Assumptions and Projection 
Methodologies, European Economy 8/2014, pp. 101; see Eurostat conclusions: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_ageing. 
12 See European Commission (2014), The 2015 Aging report - Underlying Assumptions and Projection 
Methodologies, European Economy 8/2014, pp. 4, 77.  
13 Various legislative initiatives and Germans lenient implementation of the Blue Card Directive reflect this. 
Arguably the shortage was felt even more around 2005 than nowadays, see L. Cerna, The EU Blue Card: 
Preferences, policies, and negotiations between Member States, Migration Studies, 2:1 2014, p. 88; see 
CEDEFOP projections on the development of the EU labour market generally, 
http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-visualisations/labour-force. The exact 
number of vacancies varies across different studies. 
14 Here, specific bilateral treaties with other countries have been concluded, see eg Agreement on Triple Win 
Migration between POEA and the German Federal Employment Agency on the placement of Filipino Health 
Professionals for Employment in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
15 European Commission (2015), Inception Impact Assessment, Review of Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment (“EU Blue Card” Directive), p. 2. 
16 See eg OECD (2012), Recent trends in migration from Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain into Germany, 
OECD Migration Outlook. 
17 See eg IOM (2015), More Europeans Migrate to Latin America, Caribbean than Other Way Around: IOM 
Study. 
The chart as displayed in the beginning reflects the situation in the whole of the EU. It is, 
therefore, doubtful that the economic challenges the EU faces and to an even more serious 
extent will be facing, can be solved in an intra-European way.18 A need to attract third 
country nationals (TCNs) can safely be stated.19 To meet the EU’s economic challenges a 
number of different strategies will have to be employed. Migration from non-European 
countries is one important part of the solution aside of, for example, inner-European skills 
programs, youth employment and lifelong learning initiatives.20  
 
3. EU’s approach to labour migration 
Over the past years the EU has made it a priority to tackle the aforementioned challenges by 
seeking in particular to attract so-called highly-skilled labour migrants to come to the EU. MS 
likewise have own schemes for highly skilled workers. Attracting highly-skilled migrants can 
be viewed as one of the curcial components of the EU’s Lisbon strategy and likewise the 
follow-up program “Europe 2020”.21 The EU views itself as having entered the “race for 
talent” rather late.22 As said, the “highly skilled initiative” is not the only EU policy response. 
The Blue Card Directive can, however, be regarded as one of the cornerstones of the EU 
initiatives, which considerable effort was invested into. Therefore, evaluating the success of 
the highly-skilled initiatives can be used as a proxy – even it if is not a perfect measure – to 
assess Europe’s success with its chosen strategy and the attractiveness of the EU for TCNs: 
Does the EU succeed in attracting TCNs to fill in its labour market shortages? 
 
                                                          
18 For Germany as a representative of Northern European countries: Eg H. Brücker (2015), Aktueller Bericht – 
Optionen für die Neuregelung der Einwanderung 3/15 (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung), p. 2 
states that with the financial crisis being resolved, people will move back to the South of Europe and the new 
European MS and in Germany there will be more need for TCN workers. He recommends a net migration of 
400,000 people/year. 
19 European Commission (2015), Inception Impact Assessment, Review of Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment (“EU Blue Card” Directive) asserts the EU’s need for migrants from outside the EU. 
20 See the Agenda for new skills and jobs within Europe 2020, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment, 
COM/2010/0682 final. 
21 See  L. Cerna (2013) Understanding the diversity of EU migration policy in practice: the implementation of 
the Blue Card initiative, Policy Studies, 34:2, 180-200, pp. 180; European Commission (2010), An  Agenda  for  
New  Skills  and  Jobs:  A  European  Contribution  Towards Full Employment, pp. 67; Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full 
employment, COM/2010/0682 final, pp. 1, 11. 
22 See among others L. Cerna (2014), The EU Blue Card: Preferences, policies, and negotiations between 
Member States, Migration Studies, 2:1, p. 73, 74. 
Traditionally access to the labour market is within the MS competence;23 however, a number 
of European legislative documents these days regulate the right to work by establishing a 
number of minimum requirements.24 The primary means instituted by the EU is its Blue Card 
of 2012.25 Thereby the EU wishes to attract highly-skilled TCNs.26 In order to apply for a Blue 
Card, an applicant needs to show a work contract or binding job offer with a salary of at least 
1.5 times the average gross annual salary paid in the MS concerned (MS may lower the 
salary threshold to 1.2 for certain professions where there is a particular need for TC 
workers).27 Other requirements are a valid travel document and depending on the MS a 
valid residence permit or a national long-term visa, proof of sickness insurance and 
documents stating professional qualification. If these requirements are fulfilled, within 90 
days a Blue Card is granted for an initial period of 1-4 years. Once granted Blue Card holders 
enjoy, with regard to the job they took up equal treatment with nationals in such aspects as, 
for example, working conditions, social security, pensions, education and vocational training. 
After two years of legal employment, they may receive equal treatment with nationals as 
regards access to any highly qualified employment in the same MS. After 18 months of legal 
residence, they may move to another MS to take up highly qualified employment (subject to 
the limits set by the MS on the number of non-nationals accepted). The status is coupled 
with preferential rules for acquiring long term resident status28 and for family reunification. 
The salary threshold varies with each MS.29 Whereas the negotiations on the legislative 
proposal started with the aim of achieving a uniform European standard, in the end MS are 
left with discretion on a number of matters. They may define a higher salary threshold. They 
may determine caps on admission volumes. As mentioned, the standard period of validity 
                                                          
23 Also today see Art. 79 (5) TFEU. 
24 See K. Hailbronner (2005), Arbeitsmarktzugang und Anspruch auf soziale Leistungen im europäischen 
Ausländerrecht, in: Weltinnenrecht, Festschrift für Jost Delbrück (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 315-328) p. 317. 
25 As spelled out in the Blue Card Directive. The implementation deadline ended in July 2011. 
26 See Art. 2(b) Blue Card Directive. “Higher professional qualifications”, in turn, means “qualifications attested 
by evidence of higher education qualifications or, by way of derogation, when provided for by national law, 
attested by at least five years of professional experience of a level comparable to higher education 
qualifications and which is relevant in the profession or sector specified in the work contract or binding job 
offer” (Art. 2(g) Blue Card Directive). 
27 See Art. 5 (1), (3) Blue Card Directive. 
28 If a blue card holder has, for instance, worked in a different MS that time will be added up when calculating 
whether he or she can apply for long term residence. Art. 16 (3) furthermore sets out that for the purpose of 
acquiring long term residence they may be absent from EU territory for 12 consecutive months and not more 
than 18 months in total for the calculation period. This is more favourable than the conditions for other TCNs.  
29 K. Eisele (2013), Why come here if I can go there? Assessing the ‘Attractiveness’ of the EU’s Blue Card 
Directive for ‘Highly Qualified’ Immigrants, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 60/October 2013, 
pp. 17 who concludes on p. 25 with suggestions for improvement if the Commission considered a recast. 
for the Blue Card can vary between 1 and 4 years. MS can decide whether the application 
has to be made by the applicant and/or the employer. Importantly, MS have retained an 
option with a view to applying a labour market test for the vacancy concerned. The EU Blue 
Card is not the only means to employ highly-skilled TCNs as, in addition, MS have their own 
systems of national permits for highly skilled migrants.30 Hence, we find a co-existence. The 
German scheme for example was set up first in 2000 in the quest to find IT-experts and with 
very limited success.31 The scheme expired when a number of changes were made to the 
German Migration Act in 2005 allowing highly-skilled migration more generally32 – again 
with limited success.33  
 
The apparent failure of the EU strategy to attract highly-skilled migration can be stated 
without going into great detail of the different regimes. The numbers speak for themselves. 
The next table illustrates the amount of highly-skilled workers that were contracted via the 
                                                          
30 See European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment (“EU Blue Card”), p. 4. Highly-skilled TCNs 
may also come to the EU via the Researchers Directive Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a 
specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research OJ L 289, 
3.11.2005, p. 15–22 
31 The so-called Green Card, see in particular § 4 (7) und (8) Verordnung über Ausnahmeregelungen für die 
Erteilung einer Arbeitserlaubnis an neu einreisende ausländische Arbeitnehmer (Anwerbestopp-
Ausnahmeverordnung – ASAV) and § 9 no 2 Verordnung über die Arbeitsgenehmigung für ausländische 
Arbeitnehmer (Arbeitsgenehmigungsverordnung – ArGV). 
32 See German Migration Law, Zuwanderungsgesetz, Federal Law Gazette I S. 1950. 
33 See table below. 
Blue Card and the national permit schemes:34
 
 
The EU entered the “race for talent” arguably late and not very successfully.35 Except for the 
case of Germany, the Blue Card system has shown little results only. In essence, almost all 
Blue Cards granted were issued in Germany. Germany is said to have gone further than the 
minimum requirements in the Directive when implementing it in making it more favourable 
to applicants.36 This may partly explain the success. Regarding the numbers for Germany, it 
                                                          
34 Source: European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment (“EU Blue Card”), p. 13. Note: the numbers 
for 2013 are only provisional. 
35 See among others L. Cerna (2014), The EU Blue Card: Preferences, policies, and negotiations between 
Member States, Migration Studies, 2:1, p. 73, 74; K. Eisele (2013), Why come here if I can go there? Assessing 
the ‘Attractiveness’ of the EU’s Blue Card Directive for ‘Highly Qualified’ Immigrants, CEPS Paper in Liberty and 
Security in Europe No. 60/October 2013, pp. 17. Likewise skeptical regarding the appropriateness of the 
strategy: Kahanec, M. and Zimmermann, K. F. (2011), High-Skilled Immigration Policy in Europe. DIW Berlin 
Discussion Paper No. 1096. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1767902 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1767902. 
36 Only thanks to Germany’s implementation it has not been completely irrelevant, see H. Kolb/ S. Fellmer 
(2015) Vom ‚Bremser‘ zum ‚Heizer‘? Deutschlands europäische Arbeitsmigrationspolitik, ZAR 3/2015, pp. 105: 
has to be subtracted that a certain amount of people are “Statuswechsler” that were already 
in the country under a different scheme and changed to the Blue Card scheme. The number 
of Blue Cards issued by Germany in 2014 was 11,848.37 When looking at the amount of 
people that accessed the EU’s labour market for highly-skilled via the different national 
permit schemes, the numbers are not very high either. In comparison to the US, Canada, 
Australia, the EU cannot prevail.38 Here, the migrant’s perspective and incentives obviously 
play a part.39 It can among others be identified that the parallel – European and national40 – 
schemes may lead to confusion.41 There are important language barriers to be overcome 
when coming to the EU, in particular if one aspires to intra-European mobility. The current 
European system has not achieved one single permit. National differences prevail and EU-
wide mobility is only applicable after 1.5 years of employment. It can be questioned how far 
the procedure was designed with minimal burdens in mind.42 There is a close link with the 
job, which allows potential opportunistic behaviour by employers and puts the immigrants 
under pressure – for instance if they have recently moved to Europe with their whole family. 
The Directive allows only a three months unemployment period or no more than two 
periods of unemployment for the duration of the Blue Card permit before a highly-skilled 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Germany is the only country where the Blue Card has gained some kind of importance, this is surprising in the 
sense that Germany was not very much in favour of facilitating highly-skilled migration – eg blocked EU 
initiatives in 2001 and slowed down initiatives of 2005. Already when implementing the Blue Card Directive, 
Germany was making use of much of the flexibility granted in the context of minimum harmonization:  eg no 
labour market test (only a minority of MS did this), and a rather lenient calculation method for the salary 
requirement. Overall in Germany, the Blue Card enhances and even substitutes the national regime. 
37 According to Ausländerzentralregister on 31 December 2014, as calculated by BAMF: 
http://www.bamf.de/DE/Infothek/Statistiken/BlaueKarteEU/blaue-karte-eu-node.html. Of this amount 4,673 
were granted to TCNs newly arriving to Germany. Notably in this statistic the amount of Blue Card holders for 
2013 amounts to 11,290 (of which 4,127 newly arrived) [4,018 for 2012 of which 1,557 newly arrived] and 
hence differs from the numbers available to Eurostat. The Eurostat numbers for 2013 were only preliminary. 
Additionally the German numbers underlie a different calculation method that only counts people who moved 
to the EU and obtained a Blue Card in the same year. See also M. Griesbeck (2014), Erleichterung der 
Fachkräftezuwanderung durch rechtliche Regelungen und flankierende Maßnahmen – eine Zwischenbilanz, 
ZAR 5-6/2014, p. 183.  
38 See K. Eisele (2013), Why come here if I can go there? Assessing the ‘Attractiveness’ of the EU’s Blue Card 
Directive for ‘Highly Qualified’ Immigrants, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 60/October 2013;  
Gümüs, Y. K., The EU Blue Card Scheme: The Right Step in the Right Direction, (2010) 12 European Journal of 
Migration and Law 435. 
39 See T. Eger/F. Weber (2014), Immigration Law, in: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Backhaus, Jürgen 
Georg (Ed.), (Springer, New York, 1-11), pp. 1.  
40 This exists in each MS – except for Ireland, England and Denmark that did not implement the Blue Card - see  
H. Kolb/ S. Fellmer (2015) Vom ‚Bremser‘ zum ‚Heizer‘? Deutschlands europäische Arbeitsmigrationspolitik, ZAR 
3/2015, p. 107. 
41 European Commission (2015), Inception Impact Assessment, Review of Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment (“EU Blue Card” Directive), p. 3. 
42 The EU does not seem to present itself pro-actively as a service provider facilitating job matching, even 
though some individual employers may do this. 
TCN is sent back to his or her home country. Having said this, given that the directive aims at 
minimum harmonization, MS may implement it differently and provide conditions more 
favourable to the immigrants – Germany is among the few countries that have done so.43 It 
has to be added that treating the EU as a whole may conceal some country particularities. 
Due to the financial crisis, as said, some individual European MS are currently not in need for 
immigrants but the population is migrating by itself.  
 
It would be too simplistic to claim that there is no TCN migration to the EU and that the EU 
failed completely in attracting highly-skilled migrants. Indeed, in the context of the classical 
TCN-scheme, of family reunification, via the Researchers Directive or bilateral treaties that 
MS conclude, TCNs do enter the EU’s labour market.44 There may indeed also be highly-
skilled migrants among these. The fact that there are “Statuswechsler” in Germany is 
indicative of this. Overall, the success is, however, limited. The skills shortage remains a 
concern. The lack of success of the highly-skilled regime can be regarded as indicative of the 
attractiveness of the EU for TCNs in the context of labour migration. Some doubts can be 
expressed as to whether the required migrants will actually come to the EU now and even 
more so in the coming years. Despite having singled out the goal to attract highly-skilled 
non-European migrants, the instrument, the compromise achieved by the European MS, 
does not seem to convey this message to the target group. The EU has not given up on its 
goal to become at least as attractive as the favourite migration destinations Australia, 
Canada and the USA.45 Revising the Blue Card Directive is being discussed, and new policy 
proposals may include more generous rules for TCN entrepreneurs and service providers.46 
 
4. Labour market permeability in the context of CEAS 
 
                                                          
43 See H. Kolb/ S. Fellmer (2015) Vom ‚Bremser‘ zum ‚Heizer‘? Deutschlands europäische 
Arbeitsmigrationspolitik, ZAR 3/2015. 
44 See M. Provera (2013), The Detention of Asylum Seekers in the European Union and Australia – a 
Comparative Analysis (Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP), Oisterwijk), p. 20 for details. 
45 See Political Guidelines for the next European Commission, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, 
Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change, July 2014, pp. 9. 
46 European Commission (2015), Inception Impact Assessment, Review of Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment (“EU Blue Card” Directive), pp. 1. Note that there is no mention of refugees. 
As alluded to previously the pool of asylum seekers may merit a deeper analysis in this 
regard. The scope of who is granted asylum in the different European MS varies.47 To start 
with, all European MS are parties to the 1951 UN Convention - the “Geneva Convention” – 
and the 1967 protocol that stipulates the non-refoulement obligation for refugees as defined 
in the legislative document.48 The CEAS is based upon the Geneva Convention. Hence, the 
EU has a legal obligation not to violate the principle of non-refoulement.49 Individual MS, 
however, have different interpretations of who to grant beneficiary status to with the 
minimum being the requirements set out in the Geneva Convention.  
Whereas until the mid-1980s the amount of asylum seekers coming to the EU was low and 
labour market access for those in general possible, the situation changed with the numbers 
of asylum seekers increasing since the mid-1980s.50 Many European MS have rather 
restrictive policies regulating asylum seekers’ access to the labour market these days,51 with 
the upper limit being the minimum harmonization set at EU level.52  
In the light of the challenges discussed in the foregoing section and the EU’s rather 
pronounced inability to compete for the highly-skilled as an indicator of the EU’s prospect in 
attracting desired TCNs one may question if this approach is constructive and suitable to 
meet the labour market’s demands. The economic challenges the EU is facing are partly 
unresolved – migrants are and will be lacking. However, there is another – possibly 
                                                          
47 Of the European MS Denmark, Ireland and the UK have opted out of the Common European approach and, 
hence, have retained their own asylum systems. 
48 According to Article 1A(2) a refugee is “a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual 
residence; has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion” and lacks protection in the home country. 
According to the non-refoulement clause a person cannot be forcibly returned to a territory where he/she may 
face the risk of persecution. 
49 The European Union has extended the status partly to so-called beneficiaries of „subsidiary protection“. The 
principle of "refoulement" was officially enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and is also contained in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and Article 3 of the 1984 
Convention Against Torture. 
50 M. Valenta/K. Thorshaug (2013) Restrictions on Right to Work for Asylum Seekers: The Case of the 
Scandinavian Countries, Great Britain and the Netherlands, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
20:459–482, p. 460. 
51 See eg ECRE, The EC Directive on the Reception of Asylum Seekers: Are asylum seekers in Europe receiving 
material support and access to employment in accordance with European legislation? European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles, Brussels, 2005), p. 16; T.J. Hatton (2013) “Refugee and Asylum Migration”, in International 
Handbook on the Economics of Migration, A. F. Constant, K.F. Zimmermann (eds.), Cheltenham, 
UK/Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 453-469, pp. 461. Some were going in the opposite direction, like 
Sweden, stressing the desire for asylum seekers to be able to support themselves during the application period, 
see M. Valenta/K. Thorshaug (2013) Restrictions on Right to Work for Asylum Seekers: The Case of the 
Scandinavian Countries, Great Britain and the Netherlands, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
20:459–482, p. 467. 
52 See below. 
undervalued – group of people actively seeking to come to the EU: asylum seekers. There 
are no reliable numbers regarding the composition of the group of asylum seekers. However, 
estimates for Germany state that there is a rather large group with higher qualifications 
(school and professional).53 Some of them may even be highly-skilled. At the same time, 
there is a large group with no qualifications. An under-represented group seems to be that 
of middle qualifications. In fact three quarters of the asylum seekers and recognized 
beneficiaries in Germany are in the working age (15-64) – to be precise 77 %.54 Effectively, in 
particular, few asylum seekers are employed.55 In the light of the EU’s demographic situation 
this may not be the desirable policy. Labour market access in the context of asylum policy is 
an area of “significant policy controversy”.56 Whereas asylum policy and labour migration 
are traditionally separate, one may question the extent to which this is desirable whenever 
we are talking about the same target group. Individuals within the group of asylum seekers 
may have exactly the characteristics that the EU’s labour market requires. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to write a comprehensive theory on a coherent asylum and labour 
market policy. Prima facie it seems, however, that in terms of transaction costs with a view 
to integration efforts and language skills, for example, some arguments could be formed for 
why a preference to someone who has already spend some time in the country of 
destination may be preferable over someone who would still need to migrate.  
 
To assess the scope of current interdependencies between the CEAS and labour market 
access, the next section will set out the extent to which the underlying reasons for why only 
few asylum seekers and refugees enter the labour market are legal or factual restrictions. It 
will thereby be illustrated in how far individuals going through or having gone through an 
                                                          
53 See H. Brücker (2015), Aktuelle Berichte - Asyl- und Flüchtlingsmigration in die EU und nach Deutschland 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) 8/2015, pp. 8. This is one of the few papers that states some 
data. The German government itself writes in the BT Drucks. 18/6420 on p. 2 that there is no representative 
data. 
54 H. Brücker (2015), Aktuelle Berichte - Asyl- und Flüchtlingsmigration in die EU und nach Deutschland (Institut 
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) 8/2015, p. 10. 
55 For Norway, see M. Valenta/K. Thorshaug (2012), Asylum-seekers’ perspectives on work and proof of 
identity: The Norwegian experience, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 31:2, 76-97, pp. 89, 97; M. Valenta/K. 
Thorshaug (2013) Restrictions on Right to Work for Asylum Seekers: The Case of the Scandinavian Countries, 
Great Britain and the Netherlands, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20:459–482, pp. 482: 
asylum seekers have a low rate of employment, irrespective of whether they have formal access to the labour 
market. Partly this can allegedly be attributed to asylum seekers preferring to first focus on learning the 
language before finding a “better” job in the host country.  
56 M. Garlick (2013) Asylum-seekers and people in need of international protection, in: Social benefits and 
migration – a contested relationship and policy challenge in the EU, E. Guild, S. Carrera, K. Eisele (eds.), CEPS, 
Brussels, 62-81, pp. 75. 
asylum procedure can currently enter the EU’s labour market. In a next step the scope for 
extending these rights to better meet the EU’s labour market needs will be explored. 
 
4.1. Labour market access for the different groups of people falling under the CEAS 
 
In essence, to assess the labour market permeability for people that fall under the CEAS, one 
can be guided by the different steps in the procedure of Europe’s asylum system. To start 
with asylum seekers are reaching the EU’s territory – some of them do in this in legal ways 
and others fall in the category of “irregular migrants” as it is the case with people fleeing via 
the Mediterranean Sea. Once within the EU’s borders – or in the high sea territory – the next 
step in applying for asylum is to lodge an application.57 For a number of reasons this may not 
happen immediately, so a first status to be looked at is the pre-lodging-situation (1). The 
next, obvious, group is asylum seekers that have lodged an application, whose application is 
hence being processed and who await the decision of the MS authorities (2). Thirdly, there 
are those whose asylum requests have been granted (3). Importantly, in the EU there is a co-
existence of two different statuses. In elaboration of the Geneva Convention the 
Qualifications Directive speaks of “refugees” on the one hand and includes, furthermore, 
application procedures for other kinds of international protection given under the term 
“subsidiary protection”.58 This applies to asylum seekers who do “not qualify as a refugee 
but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
concerned, if returned […], would face a real risk of suffering serious harm […]”.59 Taken 
together, both groups form the “beneficiaries of international protection” in the EU. 
Whereas the revision of the first phase of the CEAS60 had the explicit aim of aligning the two 
types of status, differences remain.61 In order to give an idea of the number of people who 
are granted the status of “subsidiary protection” recent data is illustrative: In the first half of 
2015 the German authorities processed 114.000 asylum applications. 39.552 people were 
                                                          
57 Applications for asylum can be made according to the revised Asylum Procedures Directive on the EU 
territory, including at the border, in the territorial waters or in the transit zones of the MS. 
58 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
and the content of the protection granted, OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 12–23. 
59 Article 2 (e) Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted, OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 12–23. 
60 These instruments were passed throughout the years 1999-2005. The revised version of the core documents 
was enacted starting in 2011, with a number of implementation phases ending only in July 2015. 
61 See below. 
effectively granted asylum (34.7 %) and additionally 680 people (0.6 %) were granted 
subsidiary protection.62 Recent German data shows that basically 2/3 of the applications 
filed for asylum are currently not successful. Some applications are not granted because 
Germany is not the state responsible for determining the asylum claim under the Dublin 
system but a different MS is and the case is, therefore, transferred.63 This still this leaves a 
considerable amount of requests that are not honoured (4). For the time until these people 
have to leave the country, they can be classified as “Geduldete” – being a person with 
exceptional leave to remain. Who are the people whose application is denied? There is 
heated discussion about so-called “economic refugees” who leave/have to leave their 
country due to poor socio-economic and humanitarian living conditions. Many MS do not 
consider them as potential beneficiaries of international protection under the current EU 
regime, even though legal arguments to broaden the concept can be made.64 In addition, 
from an economic point of view one can consider them in the context of labour market 
needs. It is, however, outside the scope of this paper to discuss their status in detail as it 
would require a thorough incentive and cost benefit analysis. 
 
A last group to consider may be the families of an individual at each stage of the procedure: 
before lodging, while awaiting the outcome, once recognized as a beneficiary of 
international protection or denied protection. By exercising the right to family reunification, 
family members of TCNs enter the EU territory. Again, this paper is only going to consider 
whether family members are granted a right to work in the EU (5). 
 
Lastly (6) the interrelations between the CEAS and special EU legislation that targets TCNs 
generally shall be illustrated. 
  
More specifically the different rights are the following: 
                                                          
62 http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/DE/2015/20150713-asylgeschaeftsstatistik-juni.html, 
accessed 28th July 2015. 
63 The Dublin III regulation sets out the details. It distinguishes between legal and illegal migrants seeking 
asylum and for the case of legal migrants bases the responsibility to assess a complaint on a number of criteria 
(such as family considerations, recent possession of visa or other titles). In essence, the system comes down to 
a primary responsibility of the first MS that migrants arrive to being in charge of processing the applications.  
64 See once more the numbers referred to above 
http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/DE/2015/20150713-asylgeschaeftsstatistik-juni.html, accessed 
28th July 2015. The EU in addition – for instance Germany – is discussing whether to classify various Balkan 
countries as “safe countries“ to basically allow a collective refusal of asylum requests lodged in an accelerated 
procedure. 
 (1) Situation before lodging asylum request 
 
European legislation does not make any mention of people that have not yet lodged their 
application. This, in turn, means that their rights and duties are to be determined by each 
MS individually. 
 
(2) Asylum seekers 
 
When it comes to any asylum seeker that has lodged an application the revised Receptions 
Conditions Directive of 2013 sets out the following rights: Access to the labour market has to 
be granted no later than 9 months after lodging the application.65 The next paragraph 
restricts the access rather severely when stating that: 
 
“2. Member States shall decide the conditions for granting access to the labour market for 
the applicant, in accordance with their national law, while ensuring that applicants have 
effective access to the labour market. 
For reasons of labour market policies, Member States may give priority to Union citizens and 
nationals of States parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and to legally 
resident third-country nationals.“  
 
Effectively an extensive labour market test can be upheld at the discretion of the MS. 
Generally, the 9 months period may work in tandem with a new requirement for the asylum 
procedure not to take any longer than 6 months (or 9 months in special cases).66 This would, 
implicitly, ensure that the asylum seeker is not disadvantaged if the procedure takes longer 
                                                          
65 Art. 15. This Directive was downgraded compared to the first Commission proposal: European Commission, 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers 3 December 2008, COM(2008) 815 final, see M. Provera (2013), The Detention of 
Asylum Seekers in the European Union and Australia – a Comparative Analysis (Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP), 
Oisterwijk), pp. 73. The first proposal would have granted access to the labour market after a maximum of 6 
months only. After intense discussion, various  subsequent amended proposals by the Council were made: 
Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings of the Asylum Working Party on 6 July 2011, 22 July 
2011, Document No. 12580/11; Council of the European Union, Note from Presidency to Asylum Working Party 
of 26 September 2011, 12 September 2011, Document No. 13102/11; Council of the European Union, Outcome 
of Proceedings of Asylum Working Party of 6 December 2011, 13 December 2011, Document No. 17832/11; 
Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings of JHA Counsellors on 23 January 2012, 27 January 
2012, Document No. 5515/12; Council of the European Union, Revised Note from Presidency to Permanent 
Representatives Committee on 22 February 2012, 20 February 2012, Document No. 6394/1/12 Rev 1. 
66 See Art. 31 (3) Revised Asylum Procedures Directive. 
than announced or also if going through an appeal procedure: The permission may, as stated 
in Art. 15 (3), not be “withdrawn during appeals procedures, where an appeal against a 
negative decision in a regular procedure has suspensive effect, until such time as a negative 
decision on the appeal is notified.” If a negative asylum decision is appealed, apparently, the 
duration of the procedure is extended. Comparing this provision with the predecessor in the 
Receptions Condition Directive of 2003,67 an improvement can be seen from the asylum 
seekers’ perspective. In the previous version it was stipulated that MS were allowed to 
determine the period of time upon lodging the application until which the asylum seeker 
was not allowed to have access to the labour market in Art. 11 (1). Thus, in essence wide 
discretion was granted. However, note Art. 11 (2): „if a decision at first instance has not 
been taken within one year of the presentation of an application for asylum and this delay 
cannot be attributed to the applicant, MS shall decide the conditions for granting access to 
the labour market for the applicant.” This was imposing some restrictions on the MS. Then 
again, it was not set out specifically how the MS were to grant access to the labour market. 
The labour market test likewise applied at the discretion of the MS (Art. 11 (4)). Overall, the 
conditions have become slightly more favourable to asylum seekers. Needless to say MS may 
go even further than the minimum requirements set out in the new directive. However, 
when comparing the implementation measures in the MS against the due date 21st July 
2015, one can see that many MS have not implemented the revised Reception conditions 
directive in time.68 There is, hence, EU wide a strong implementation deficit, many MS 
regulations still only conform with the old regime only69 and the MS implementation 
measures need to be awaited to see how far reaching they are.  
In Germany asylum seekers (and “Geduldete”) may not work in the first three months.70 
Then the labour market test-situation kicks in. The German Federal Employment Agency – 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit needs to give permission for the asylum seeker to work. 
Alternatively, for certain jobs it may be stipulated by regulation that the intervention by the 
authority is not necessary. After 15 months asylum seekers may work without any 
                                                          
67 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers. 
68 Eur-lex website NIM, accessed on 28th July 2015.  
69 Regarding the implementation measures, see Odysseus (2006), Comparative overview of the implementation 
of the Directive 2003/9 of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards of the reception of asylum seekers 
in the EU Member States” (Odysseus Academic Network for Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum in 
Europe, Brussels). 
70 See Asylum Procedure Act – Asylverfahrensgesetz (AsylVfG) § 61 Erwerbstätigkeit. 
restriction. The German rules were changed in 2013 by way of an early implementation of 
the revised Receptions Conditions Directive.71 With abolishing a labour market test for 
anyone whose procedure takes longer than 15 months, Germany went further than the 
requirements in the Directive. Apparently, even if after 15 months no labour market test is 
applicable, asylum seekers may still face a large number of challenges in finding a job, 
challenges that are beyond legal rights (such as language barriers, no match in qualifications 
…).72 
 
(3) Beneficiaries of international protection 
 
Coming to the next group, the recognized beneficiaries of international protection, a 
stronger right to work is stipulated. Access to the labour market is directly possible and 
applies without restrictions: They may engage in employed or self-employed activities 
immediately after protection has been granted (Art. 26). Among others the same conditions 
for recognition of foreign diplomas apply as for nationals (Art. 28).  
Regarding the revised Qualifications Directive of 2011 that sets out these rights the 
implementation deadline has already passed since 2013.73 Previously, the rights for refugees 
were in essence the same as under the revised regime. However, a differentiation was being 
made between them and those benefitting from “subsidiary protection” status: For those 
under the „subsidiary protection” regime a labour market test could be applicable. Access to 
employment-related education was at MS discretion. A considerable alignment has, hence, 
happened with the new regime. In Germany, for instance, in line with the European 
Directive for the group of those under the “subsidiary protection”-regime, since 2013 the 
German Federal Employment Agency – Bundesagentur für Arbeit is no longer involved and 
the labour market test was abolished.74 So, there are no limits in accessing the labour 
market in the respective MS from a legal point of view. 
 
 
                                                          
71 Federal Law Gazette I p. 3556, Law of 6.9.2013. 
72 Indicative: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/arbeitsmarkt-bundesagentur-daempft-hoffnung-fuer-
fluechtlinge-a-1050705.html. 
73 With the exception of Spain and France – however for refugees the rights were the same also under the old 
regime. 
74 Now: § 31 Beschäftigungsverfahrensordnung (BeschVerfV) – Employment Procedures Order since 1.7.2013. 
 (4) Application denied 
 
There is a significant amount of unsuccessful asylum applications. The EU legislation does 
not specify the labour rights of those whose application was denied.75 Often these people do 
not (immediately) leave EU territory. 
When applying for asylum and if the procedure takes longer than 9 months, clearly, 
everyone – hence also someone with low prospects of being granted international 
protection – currently has to be granted a right to access the MS respective labour market 
with the labour market test applying at the MS discretion. In Germany after 15 months in 
the process, they do likewise not need to pass the labour market test. This situation, for 
instance, in Germany, stays the same once the application is denied. “Geduldete” is the 
German term for those whose application was denied, and who enjoy in essence the same 
rights as asylum seekers.76 For how long someone would be in this situation, depends on 
how long it takes until someone deliberately leaves the country or is deported. Apart from 
the rules on labour market access, that are the focus of this contribution, other rights eg to 
some limited social and health care benefits are applicable to them and to any other of the 
groups discussed.77  
 
(5) Family members 
 
When it comes to the right to family reunification, there is an express provision in the 
respective directive:78 Recognised refugees can apply immediately for family reunification – 
with no minimum period of residence, for instance, being required. “According to Article 14 
(1) The sponsor's family members shall be entitled, in the same way as the sponsor, to: […] 
(b) access to employment and self-employed activity […].” Thus, given that refugees have 
                                                          
75 Arguably limits are set through the Employer Sancitons Directive, Directive 2009/52/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures 
against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 168, 30.6.2009, p. 24–32.  
76 § 32 (5) Beschäftigungsverfahrensordnung (BeschVerfV) – Employment Procedures Order. The same is true if 
they switch to the highly-skilled scheme. After 4 years, there is no need to involve the authority at all: § 32 (3) 
Beschäftigungsverfahrensordnung (BeschVerfV) – Employment Procedures Order. 
77 For an overview, see M. Garlick (2013) Asylum-seeker and people in need of international protection, in: 
Social benefits and migration – a contested relationship and policy challenge in the EU, E. Guild, S. Carrera, K. 
Eisele (eds.), CEPS, Brussels, 62-81. 
78 See Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification. 
immediate and unlimited access to the labour market, the same applies in principle to the 
family. Art. 14 (2), however, adds a certain form of a labour market test when specifying that 
“Member States may decide according to national law the conditions under which family 
members shall exercise an employed or self-employed activity. These conditions shall set a 
time limit which shall in no case exceed 12 months, during which Member States may 
examine the situation of their labour market before authorising family members to exercise 
an employed or self-employed activity.” MS may restrict the right to family reunification to 
refugees whose family relationships predate their entry.79 The refugees’ right to family 
reunification differs from ordinary family reunification adapting it to their special situation.80 
MS, furthermore, generally have some discretion when it comes to the right to defining who 
qualifies as a family member and has, therefore, a right to work.81  
When it comes to family reunification rights of asylum seekers and holders of subsidiary 
protection status, the rights are far more limited.82 Both groups are excluded from the scope 
of the Family Reunification Directive. A recent 2014 Commission Guidance expresses its 
favourable position to aligning the status of recognized refugees and holders of “subsidiary 
protection” status.83 Germany has implemented this suggestion.84 The Commission 
Guidance does, however, not comment upon asylum seekers.  
 
(6) Ties with special EU legislation for TCNs 
 
Regarding the permeability between the Blue Card scheme and the CEAS Art. 3 (b) Blue Card 
Directive excludes beneficiaries of, and applicants for, international protection from its 
scope. This, also clearly applies to those not even having lodged an application. On the other 
hand, the Directive is an instrument of minimum harmonization according to its Art. 4.85 The 
                                                          
79 Art. 9 (2). 
80 See. Art. 12. This privilege may elapse if the refugee does not apply for family reunification within 3 months 
after being granted the status. Generally, the provisions are without prejudice to any family member being 
granted refugee status (see Art. 9 (3)). 
81 See Art. 4. 
82 Excluded according to Art. 3 (2) (a), (c). 
83 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for 
application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification Brussels, 3.4.2014 COM(2014) 210 final. 
84 See § 29 II Aufenthaltsgesetz (AufenthG) – Residence Act. 
85 Article 4 - More favourable provisions 
1. This Directive shall be without prejudice to more favourable provisions of: 
(a) Community law, including bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between the Community or 
between the Community and its Member States and one or more third countries; 
restricted scope of the Blue Card Directive is also expressed in its Art. 10 that sets out the 
permit needed – valid residence permit or national  long stay visa – to make an “in EU” 
application for a Blue Card which only few exceptions can be granted to and are, 
furthermore, largely at the discretion of the MS. Germany is discussing an extension of the 
Blue Card for refugees.86 It can be questioned whether Germany has the competence to 
extending the scheme at all. Arguably, Germany could alternatively expand the national 
highly-skilled regime due to the explicit exclusion in the Directive. Due to the explicit 
exclusion, such a measure may not be covered by being a more favourable condition in the 
context of minimum harmonization. One possibility to overcome this would be revising the 
Blue Card Directive with a view to including refugees and the like. This is not part of the 
current discussions at EU level, however.87 
 
How does the asylum policy and the right to long-term residence relate? Under the Single 
Permit Directive the rights and duties of TCN that have come for the purpose of work , study, 
research or family reunification, except long term residents and highly-skilled workers, are 
spelled out.88 Importantly, the Directive codifies the conditions to acquire long term 
residence status. Since 2013 newly also beneficiaries of international protection – who were 
previously excluded from the scope of the directive – may acquire long-term resident status 
on a similar basis as other TCNs legally residing in the EU for more than five years.89 Asylum 
seekers are excluded from the scope of the Directive.90 Given the specific nature of the 
status of the beneficiaries there is a special arrangement for the calculation of the five years 
period required. As a basic rule at least half of the period between the date on which the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(b) bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between one or more Member States and one or more third 
countries.   
2. This Directive shall not affect the right of Member States to adopt or retain more favourable provisions for 
persons to whom it applies in respect of the following provisions of this Directive: 
(a) Article 5(3) in application of Article 18; 
(b) Articles 11, 12(1), second sentence, 12(2), 13, 14, 15 and 16(4). 
86 Eg http://www.dw.com/en/lawmaker-warns-against-blue-cards-for-asylum-seekers/a-18598620. 
87 The latest policy document is European Commission (2015), Inception Impact Assessment, Review of 
Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment (“EU Blue Card” Directive), pp. 1: There is no mention of refugees. 
88 See Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single 
application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a 
Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State. 
89 Directive 2011/51/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 amending Council 
Directive 2003/109/EC to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection, see the new Arts. 2 (f), 
19a.   
90 Art. 3 (2) (c), (d). 
application for international protection was lodged and the date on which it is granted is 
taken into account. In exceptional cases where the asylum procedure takes more than 18 
months, the whole period is to be taken into account.91 Importantly the long term residence 
status is dependent on the beneficiary status. According to Article 9.3a.”Member States may 
withdraw the long-term resident status in the event of the revocation of, ending of or refusal 
to renew international protection as laid down in Articles 14(3) and 19(3) of Directive 
2004/83/EC if the long-term resident status was obtained on the basis of international 
protection.” At the same time there is a special, more protective regime when it comes to 
expelling beneficiaries of international protection.92 
  
                                                          
91 Art. 4 (2). 
92 See amendments to Art. 12. 
4.2. Discussion  
 
Regarding access to the EU labour market differentiations are made between the different 
groups considered. Once granted the status of “beneficiary of international protection” EU-
wide, no legal limits are applicable when it comes to access to the respective MS labour 
market. The same can be true for the families of refugees joining in the context of family 
reunification. MS may, however, impose restrictions on them. As mentioned, as such it may 
be more difficult for a TCN to find a job than for a national (due to language barriers, 
differences in education, cultural barriers, missing university certificates etc.). One remaining 
question with a view to labour market permeability is concerned with whether beneficiaries 
of international protection could qualify as Blue Card holders and benefit from this regime. 
As said, this seems doubtful due to the explicit exclusion, even if the Directive aims at 
minimum harmonization only. Ways could, however, be imagined to include them, eg. by 
way of revising the Directive (or extending national labour market schemes). From a labour 
market policy point of view, such a move seems to be desirable. To assess whether it could 
be a successful strategy, it is worthwhile to raise the question of what the advantages of the 
Blue Card regime would be for the migrant compared to the asylum regime: A recognized 
refugee has full and immediate access to the labour market and has the right to family 
reunification (with the family having an (at least limited) right to access the labour market, 
too). A recognized refugee can profit from the long term residence status with special rules 
for refugees applying in terms of the calculation of the 5 year period.93 This status, in 
general, leads to a rather secure European residence title, stipulating only very few grounds 
to be expelled.94 There are some special rules for all beneficiaries of international 
protection: On the one hand while protected they cannot be sent back to that state. On the 
other hand the long term residence status is tied to the need for protection and therefore, 
can be withdrawn, once the need for protection expires. This is an important downside. All 
schemes involve renewal periods, both for Blue Card holders as well as holders of refugee 
status. The initial refugee status is granted for 3 years. A Blue Card may be granted for 1-4 
years. The Blue Card regime allows more intra-MS mobility than the long term status 
                                                          
93 MS again, may make the provision more favourable: see Germany. 
94 The conduct on which expulsion decisions are based must constitute an actual and sufficiently serious threat 
to public policy or public security. Such decisions may not be founded on economic considerations. EU 
countries undertake to consider specific factors before taking a decision to expel a long-term resident (age of 
the person concerned, duration of residence, etc.). 
acquired under the Single Permit Directive does.95 Overall it seems that permeability to the 
Blue Card scheme would actually be interesting from the migrants’ perspective. A few 
adaptations may have to be necessary though. One risky element from the migrant’s point 
of view generally is the effect of periods of unemployment. This could not work in the same 
way with a view to all beneficiaries of international protection as they could not simply go 
back to their country of origin. Regarding holders of subsidiary protection more specifically 
the Blue Card scheme may be even more beneficial. To start with under the asylum policy 
they are granted a permit for only 1 year (upon renewal for at least 2 years). Depending on 
the MS, Blue Cards can be granted for an initial period for up to 4 years. Holders of 
subsidiary protection, furthermore, have more limited rights for family reunification and 
may profit from the Blue Card regime in this respect. 
 
For asylum seekers, whose application is pending, the rights are much more limited. In 
starting to answer why few asylum seekers effectively work, there are thus not only factual 
but also legal limits. The sovereignty to decide as to whether a labour market test is upheld 
rests with each MS. Variations, therefore, exist. This is even more true for anyone who has 
not lodged the application yet or whose application has been denied. The German rules in 
this regard were set out. The German rules seem to rest upon the assumption that every 
asylum seeker immediately applies for asylum and except for the three months barrier no 
special rules are set out for those who will lodge an application. With the abolition of any 
restrictions regarding the labour market access for asylum seekers after 15 months – in 
essence the status being aligned with that of a beneficiary at that point with respect to 
labour market access – the German system is rather liberal. MS were, however, not 
required, to do so. For asylum seekers MS may uphold the “labour market test” during the 
whole period. There is interplay with the duration of the asylum procedure. Due to the high 
numbers of asylum seekers the systems in some MS are currently overburdened. In 
Germany the average duration in the first half of 2015 was 5.3 months.96 However, there are 
strong variations depending on the country of origin of the applicant. For some applicants 
waiting times regularly exceed even the 9 months period. In the light of an all time high that 
                                                          
95 Art. 18 (1) Blue Card Directive vs. Art. 11 Single Permit Directive. 
96 http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/asylverfahren-109.html According to BAMF data.  
is expected with a view to asylum applications in 2015, this number is likely to rise.97 In other 
countries the duration is even longer. Also, with the systems being overburdened, people for 
a longer time may be in a situation in which they have not even filed an application yet. 
Under the current rules – also in Germany – this may extend the period during which there is 
effectively no access to the labour market.  
Asylum seekers do not have any rights in the context of family reunification when it comes 
to family members not being on EU territory.98 Coming back to the Blue Card regime and 
whether it may be beneficial for individuals, there is something to be said in favour of a 
preference for the Blue Card scheme over the status of asylum seeker: The benefits for an 
asylum seeker to switch to the blue card scheme are rather obvious as this allows them to 
immediately get rid of such restrictions as “labour market tests”, and acquire rights to family 
reunification and mobility. Needless to say the status is also preferable to the situation 
which one is in before lodging the asylum application.  
 
Scholars are discussing transaction costs arguments and a lower burden for the asylum 
system, if a rechanneling to labour market schemes is possible.99 It would help ensure faster 
asylum procedures for those that fulfill the legal requirements. In a similar vein, classifying 
countries as “safe countries” which allows for faster procedures is discussed.100 A clearer 
system – possibly more liberal – to allow labour migration may arguably reduce the 
incentives of people with low prospects to be granted asylum to come to the EU via the 
asylum regime.101 Something may be said for the case of asylum seekers (even with low 
prospects of being granted asylum) that could carry out highly-qualified work but lacked 
awareness of the Blue Card scheme when coming to Europe. In this regard it has been 
referred to the estimations on the composition of the group of asylum seekers. The lack of 
success of the EU’s highly-skilled strategy has, furthermore, by way of example been 
outlined in detail. Again, one would have to question the legal boundaries of expanding the 
                                                          
97 http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/neue-fluechtlingsprognose-bis-zu-750-000-asylbewerber-
in-diesem-jahr/12200244.html. 
98 Some rights on the basis of the principle of family unity do exist under the Dublin regulation if family 
members are spread over various MS, see its recitals 14 and following and Art. 10. 
99 H. Brücker (2015), Aktueller Bericht – Asyl- und Flüchtlingsmigration in die EU und nach Deutschland (Institut 
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung)  8/15, p. 16. Allegedly this is done in Sweden. 
100 Eg very heavily in Germany. A more restrictive asylum law has recently been passed: 
Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz, published in Bundesgesetzblatt 2015: I No. 40, Bonn, 23 October 2015, 
pp. 1722. It entered into force on 24 October 2015. 
101 H. Brücker (2015), Aktueller Bericht – Asyl- und Flüchtlingsmigration in die EU und nach Deutschland 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung)  8/15, p. 15. 
scheme given that the Blue Card explicitly excludes certain groups of people. Either way MS 
could easily include anyone under the national permit schemes for highly skilled roles. 
Having talked about highly-skilled, the same case could possibly be made for any other 
schemes for economic migrants that could not be dealt with in detail in this paper. The EU’s 
need for migrants is not limited to the highly-skilled.102 Whereas there are, hence, a number 
of supportive arguments for aligning asylum and labour market policies to the extent that 
they deal with the same target group, some caution is likewise required. The open or 
restrictive way in which access to the EU’s labour market is granted does not only have an 
impact on asylum seekers currently on EU territory but also for prospective migrants to 
come. When redesigning asylum policy with a view to the EU’s labour market needs, it has to 
be kept in mind that the EU from an economic point of view does not have an unlimited 
capacity to employ people but it does, however, have a legal obligation to grant protection 
to those whore are in its territory and need it. Reforms, therefore, have to be carefully 
drafted. Having said this, current evidence as to whether refugees take into consideration 
access to labour market at all when migrating allots only a minor role to such 
considerations.103 They have little knowledge about conditions (including work permits etc.) 
in the host countries.104 However, abusive behaviour by migrants, possibly counting on 
overstaying the (unsuccessful) asylum procedure is a concern in the MS.105 Note lastly that 
                                                          
102 For Germany also the need for non-qualified workers is confirmed, H. Brücker (2015), Aktueller Bericht – 
Asyl- und Flüchtlingsmigration in die EU und nach Deutschland (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung)  
8/15, p. 15. In Germany there is discussion on whether an exception should be formulated to the recently 
introduced rules on the minimum wage. 
103 See J.P. Brekke & M. Aarset, Why Norway? Understanding Asylum Destinations, Report, Oslo, Institutt for 
samfunnsforskning (ISF), 2009, available at: www.samfunnsforskning.no/content/download/23142/ 
544824/file/R_2009_12_web.pdf (last visited 24 Jan. 2012); Jørgensen & Meret, “Irregular Migration”; 
Andersson & Nilsson, “Asylum Seekers”; Valenta et al., Asylsøkeres rett; see for an analysis of empirical 
literature on incentives of refugees and countries regulating migration, J. Gutmann (2015) The Economic 
Analysis of Refugee Law, Hamburg Law Review 15:2, 41-48. Worsening the living conditions in the receiving 
countries did not have an effect on the inflow of asylum seekers, limiting labour market access was found to 
increase property crimes according to one study by Bell, Brian, Francesco Fasani and Stephen Machin (2013). 
Crime and Immigration: Evidence from Large Immigrant Waves. The Review of Economics and Statistics 
95(4):1278-90. This finding casts some doubt on the desirability of restricting access to the labour market. See 
also the studies referred to by T.J. Hatton (2013) “Refugee and Asylum Migration”, in International Handbook 
on the Economics of Migration, A. F. Constant, K.F. Zimmermann (eds.), Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, 
USA: Edward Elgar, 453-469, pp. 463. 
104 M. Valenta/K. Thorshaug (2012), Asylum-seekers’ perspectives on work and proof of identity: The 
Norwegian experience, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 31:2, 76-97, p. 85. 
105 See M. Valenta/K. Thorshaug (2013) Restrictions on Right to Work for Asylum Seekers: The Case of the 
Scandinavian Countries, Great Britain and the Netherlands, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
20:459–482, p. 462 refer to the potential “pull effect” of a liberal strategy. 
granting access to the labour market generally saves people from the risks of joining black 
labour markets.106  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The paper starts off by setting out the EU’s current and future economic challenges with a 
view to the ageing population and low fertility rates – demographic change. Two trends can 
be observed: Firstly that of a lack of success of Europe’s highly-skilled regime is an indicator 
of a lack of success of the EU’s labour migration policy when targeting non-Europeans. To 
put it bluntly, the EU may not be so interesting for TCNs to migrate to work after all. And 
secondly that labour market access for people that come to the EU to seek asylum on the 
other hand is subject to quite a number of restrictions.  The paper went on to setting out the 
rights and limits of labour market access for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of 
international protection, the same as for those who have not lodged their application yet or 
those whose application was denied and their families.  
There are strong rights to work in the EU for beneficiaries of international protection, for 
both, those profiting from refugee status and those benefitting from subsidiary protection 
schemes. Access for asylum seekers, those that have not even filed their application and 
those whose application was denied are typically severely restricted under EU legislation. MS 
are, however, left with a considerable amount of discretion when it comes to granting 
asylum seekers better rights than those made available under EU legislation. It was 
mentioned that most EU MS have not implemented some of the revised Directives yet. MS 
may, furthermore, also treat beneficiaries of international protection even better than EU 
legislation requires and align the status of recognized beneficiaries of subsidiary protection 
and recognizes refugees more than EU legislation does (eg in the context of family 
reunification). Germany’s response was exemplified. There seem to be limits to expanding 
the Blue Card scheme for all the groups considered, given the explicit exclusion from the 
scope of the Directive. Accessibility of national highly-skilled or other workers’ schemes is 
possible at all times. 
                                                          
106 See M. Valenta/K. Thorshaug (2013) Restrictions on Right to Work for Asylum Seekers: The Case of the 
Scandinavian Countries, Great Britain and the Netherlands, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
20:459–482, p. 462. 
MS put forward a number of arguments for why the access to the labour market should be 
restricted for asylum seekers, refugees etc.107 In the light of the formulated policy 
inconsistency one may question whether the need for migrants that is a given in the EU 
should not play a stronger role in formulating the asylum policy and the possibilities of 
accessing the labour market thereby acquired.108 Given the EU’s failure to attract the desired 
migrants via its labour migration policies, a more favourable approach towards those 
migrants who actively come to the EU may be fruitful. The current policy seems short-
sighted in the light of the upcoming challenges and the EU’s need for migrants. This may not 
only be true for the highly-skilled strategy that was used to illustrate the (doubtful) degree of 
the EU’s attractiveness but also for other economic migrants. The skills shortage does not 
only extend to highly-qualified work. This paper, hence, pleads for considering the broad 
picture of an EU in need of migrants – now and in the future – also when formulating asylum 
policy. It warns against overly deterring migrants that the EU is actually in need of. The paper 
sought to disentangle a policy inconsistency, rising awareness that both policies – asylum 
and labour migration – may to quite some extent be addressing the very same people.  
 
EU Migration policy is a highly complex field that requires a careful weighing of many 
stakeholders’ interests to avoid unintended consequences. In this exercise the observed 
policy inconsistency should find more attentive ears at EU level. 
 
                                                          
107 See discussions in the context of downgrading the first Commission proposal to amend the Receptions 
Conditions Directive, as referred to above. 
108 Brücker, for instance, has calculated a scenario, estimating how many people would enter the German 
labour market with which level of qualifications, see H. Brücker (2015), Aktueller Bericht – Asyl- und 
Flüchtlingsmigration in die EU und nach Deutschland (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung)  8/15, p. 
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